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Supreme Court Decision Making
Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger, and Pauline T. Kim
P olitical scientists and legal academics have long scru-tinized the U.S. Supreme Court’s work to understandwhat motivates the justices. Despite significant differ-
ences in methodology, both disciplines seek to explain the
Court’s decisions by focusing on examining past cases. This
retrospective orientation is surprising. In other areas of gov-
ernment, for example, presidential elections and congres-
sional decision making,1 political scientists engage in
systematic efforts to predict outcomes, yet few have done
this for court decisions. Legal academics, too, possess exper-
tise that should enable them to forecast legal events with
some accuracy. After all, the everyday practice of law requires
lawyers to predict court decisions in order to advise clients
or determine litigation strategies.
The best test of an explanatory theory is its ability to
predict future events. To the extent that scholars in both
disciplines seek to explain court behavior, they ought to test
their theories not only against cases already decided, but
against future outcomes as well. Employing two different
methods, we attempted to predict the outcome of every
case pending before the Supreme Court during its October
2002 term and compared those predictions to the actual
decisions. One method used a statistical forecasting model
based on information derived from past Supreme Court
decisions. The other captured the expert judgments of legal
academics and professionals. Using these two distinct meth-
ods allows us to test their predictive power not only against
actual Court outcomes, but also against each other.
In comparing a statistical model with actual legal experts,
we do not join the stylized debate between “attitudinalism”
and “legalism.” Rather than arraying the justices in simple
ideological space, our statistical model relies on informa-
tion from past cases to discern patterns in the justices’ votes
based on observable case characteristics, and to construct
classification trees to predict outcomes based on the char-
acteristics of the pending cases. Conversely, our legal experts
considered many factors beyond “the law” in making their
predictions. Although they read legal materials, such as court
opinions and the parties’ briefs, legal experts also took
account of factors such as the justices’ policy preferences
and ideologies.
The critical difference between the two methods of pre-
diction lies not in the law/politics dichotomy, but in the
nature of the inputs used to generate predictions. The sta-
tistical model looked at only a handful of case characteris-
tics, each of them gross features easily observable without
specialized training. The legal experts, by contrast, could
use particularized knowledge, such as the specific facts of
the case or statements by individual justices in similar cases.
The statistical model also differed from the experts in explic-
itly taking into account every case decided by this natural
court prior to the 2002 term. No individual could have
such comprehensive knowledge of the Court’s output for
the last eight terms, and so the experts necessarily relied on
fewer (albeit more detailed) observations of past Court
behavior.
Not surprisingly, these different decision-making pro-
cesses often resulted in divergent predictions in particular
cases. More unexpectedly, for the 2002 term, the statistical
model more accurately predicted case outcomes, while the
experts did slightly better overall at predicting the votes of
individual justices. The model’s success in predicting out-
comes was in large part due to its relatively greater success
in predicting the votes of the five most conservative jus-
tices on the Court, including the pivotal Justice O’Connor.
These results raise interesting questions about when a global,
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quantitative approach has a
comparative advantage over
particularized, expert knowl-
edge in predicting case out-
comes, and vice versa.2
The Statistical
Model
Our approach begins with data
from all 628 cases previously
decided by this natural court.3
We use these data to estimate
classification trees, which were
selected with a view to opti-
mally forecasting case out-
comes. The set of estimated
classification trees are thus the
“statistical model,”4 which is
used to predict the outcomes
of each case.5
For each case, we collected
six observable characteristics to
be used as explanatory vari-
ables, each of which had to
be available before oral argu-
ment so they could be used
for forecasting: (1) the circuit
of origin for the case;6 (2) the
issue area of the case, coded
from the petitioner’s brief
using Spaeth’s protocol; (3) the
type of petitioner (e.g., the
United States, an injured per-
son, an employer); (4) the type
of respondent; (5) the ideolog-
ical direction of the lower
court ruling, also coded from the petitioner’s brief using
Spaeth’s protocol; and (6) whether or not the petitioner
argued the constitutionality of a law or practice.
Unlike most statistical work in political science, these
variables were not chosen for explicitly theoretical reasons.
Rather, they were chosen based on their availability and
plausible relationship to Supreme Court decision making.
Some variables, such as the ideological direction of the lower
court decision, likely capture attitudinal factors,7 while oth-
ers, such as the type of petitioner, are less strongly tied to
extant theory. This forecasting exercise was not one of theory
testing, but rather one of determining whether systematic
patterns can be uncovered using these variables.
For each case that we predicted for this study, we used
the estimated classification trees to generate a forecast prior
to oral argument. In figure 1 we present the estimated clas-
sification tree for Justice O’Connor.8 To illustrate how a
classification tree works, consider Grutter v. Bollinger
(2003)—the law school affirmative action case. In this case
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
the law school’s consideration of race to achieve a diverse
student body served a compelling state interest. We code
this case as a liberal decision in the civil rights issue area.
Proceeding down the tree, the lower-court decision is lib-
eral, and we thus (incorrectly) forecast reversal. Had the
lower-court decision been conservative, we would have pro-
gressed further down the decision tree. Note that the same
prediction holds in the undergraduate affirmative action
case (Gratz v. Bollinger [2003]) because the characteristics
of the case are the same; in this case, the statistical model
correctly forecast Justice O’Connor’s vote. These estimated
classification trees should not be interpreted causally; in
figure 1, for example, it would be incorrect to infer that the
fact that the Second Circuit issued a conservative decision
would cause Justice O’Connor to affirm. Rather, for some
reason (likely due to the agenda process), Justice O’Connor
Figure 1
Estimated classification tree for Justice O’Connor for forecasted
nonunanimous cases
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tends to affirm cases decided in a conservative direction by
the Second Circuit.
The Legal Experts
The study’s other method of prediction sought to capture
the judgments of legal experts. Experts are distinguished
from nonexperts by extensive training and experience in
the relevant domain; they also have the ability to perceive
meaningful patterns that cannot easily be coded into a sta-
tistical model and to structure their knowledge around
principle-based schema. Often their judgments are based
on qualitative analyses. The process underlying the judg-
ments of our legal experts thus differed considerably from
that underlying the model.
Because no metric exists to measure expertise precisely,
we recruited participants much the way anyone might look
for expert assistance: we researched their writings, checked
their training and experience, and relied on referrals from
knowledgeable colleagues. The 83 individuals who partici-
pated easily qualify as “experts,” having written and taught
about, practiced before, and/or clerked at the Supreme Court,
and developed special knowledge in one or more substan-
tive fields of law.9 Collectively, they form an accomplished
group of 71 academics and 12 appellate attorneys. Of this
group, 38 clerked for a Supreme Court justice, 33 hold
chaired professorships, and 5 are current or former law school
deans.
We asked experts to predict a case or cases within their
areas of expertise. Experts assigned to the same case did not
communicate with one another about their predictions. We
requested their forecasts prior to oral argument, assuring
them that their individual predictions and the cases to which
they were assigned would not be revealed. Their predictions
took the form of an “affirm or reverse” choice for the Court
as a whole and for each justice. The bluntness of this binary
choice precluded discussion of the kind of doctrinal nuance
and partial holdings that are important to lawyers. How-
ever, limiting experts to a binary choice was necessary for
direct comparison with the output from the statistical model.
Experts were free to consider any sources of information
or factors they thought relevant to making their prediction.
We provided a copy of the lower court opinion and cita-
tions to the parties’ Supreme Court briefs, but did not limit
experts to these materials. After they had returned their
prediction for a particular case, we surveyed them regarding
what factors were important to their decision. Nearly 90
percent of the experts completed at least one survey.
Results
We posted all of the statistical model and expert forecasts
on the project Web site (http://wusct.wustl.edu) prior to
oral argument. After decision, case outcomes and individ-
ual justice votes were coded “affirm” or “reverse.” Cases that
were vacated and remanded or reversed even in part were
coded as “reverse.” We use 68 cases to analyze the case
outcome forecasts10 and 67 to analyze individual vote
predictions.11
As seen in table 1, the model correctly forecast 75.0 per-
cent of ultimate case outcomes, while the experts’ predic-
tions had an accuracy rate of only 59.1 percent. In forecasting
individual justice votes, the experts did marginally better
than the model. The experts’ vote predictions were 67.9
percent accurate, compared to 66.7 percent correct for the
model. See table 2.
In tables 1 and 2 we treat each expert independently,
summarizing the results by aggregating all expert predic-
tions. As an alternative method of comparison,12 we take
the predictions of a majority of the experts on a particular
case to generate an “expert consensus” forecast. Using the
“expert consensus” forecast results in somewhat similar
results, depending upon how we treat inconclusive fore-
casts.13 See table 3.
For all of the tables we report the estimated (conditional
maximum likelihood) odds ratio, and a p-value from Fisher’s
Exact Test.14 The null hypothesis is that the proportion of
correct predictions by the model and the experts is the same.
In table 1, which treats all expert predictions indepen-
dently, the difference in forecasting accuracy of the model
Table 1
Model and expert forecasts of case
outcome for decided cases
Case outcome forecast
Correct Incorrect Total
Model 51 (75.0%) 17 (25.0%) 68 (100.0%)
Experts 101 (59.1%) 70 (40.9%) 171 (100.0%)
Note: Table is based on 68 cases. The unit of analysis is the
case-prediction. Row percentages are in parentheses. The esti-
mated (conditional maximum likelihood) odds ratio is 2.073
(p = 0.025, Fisher’s exact test).
Table 2
Model and expert forecasts of individual
justice’s votes for decided cases
Justice vote forecast
Correct Incorrect Total
Model 400 (66.7%) 200 (33.3%) 600 (100.0%)
Experts 1015 (67.9%) 479 (32.1%) 1494 (100.0%)
Note: Table is based on 67 cases. The unit of analysis is the
justice-case-prediction. Row percentages are in parentheses.
Some justices did not vote on some cases, and are thus not
included. The estimated (conditional maximum likelihood) odds
ratio is 0.943 (p = 0.571, Fisher’s exact test).
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and the experts is statistically significant. The model clearly
beats the experts on these cases, although a different result
might well be obtained in a different term with another
group of experts.
Of greater significance than the winner of this particular
contest is the model’s considerable success in forecasting
case outcomes. Why did the experts not do as well in pre-
dicting case outcomes? The explanation may well lie in their
relative inability to predict the votes of Justice O’Connor.
Figure 2 graphs the proportion of correctly predicted votes
by the model and the experts, for each justice. As seen in
the figure, the experts did worst at predicting O’Connor’s
votes among all the justices, and considerably worse than
the model. Because O’Connor is often thought of as the
Court’s pivotal justice, the experts’ relative lack of success in
predicting her votes meant a poorer showing than the model
in forecasting case outcomes.
Figure 2 arrays the justices along the vertical axis in order
of increasing conservatism as estimated for the 2001 term
by Martin and Quinn.15 Focusing on the proportion of
each justice’s votes that the experts were able to predict
correctly reveals an interesting pattern. The proportion of
correct predictions forms a sideways V-shape, indicating
that the experts were most accurate at predicting the votes
of the most ideologically extreme justices and least success-
ful at forecasting the votes of the centrist justices. This pat-
tern is consistent with attitudinalist explanations of justices’
votes, and legal experts’ implicit acceptance, at least in part,
of an attitudinalist explanation. In fact, a solid majority of
legal experts reported that the justices’ policy preferences
and their conservative or liberal ideologies were important
factors in making their predictions.16
We have also sorted our results by issue area using
Spaeth’s coding protocol.17 Figures 3 and 4 display the
proportion of correctly predicted case outcomes and jus-
tice votes for issue areas with
five or more cases in our sam-
ple. These figures suggest that
the relative success of the two
methods varies significantly
depending upon the issue area.
Given the small number of
cases in each category, these
comparisons are obviously quite
sensitive to the category defini-
tions and the coding decisions
in individual cases. Neverthe-
less, the relative success of the
experts in certain issue areas
suggests that the particularized
knowledge to which they have
access may provide a compara-
tive advantage in predicting
outcomes of certain types of
cases.
The experts did significantly better than the model in
predicting the judicial power cases (see figs. 3 and 4). These
cases generally involved narrow technical issues of proce-
dure in which the rule of decision was unlikely to have
much impact outside the legal system itself. For example,
Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete, in which all three experts correctly
predicted a 9–0 affirmance and the model predicted a 5–4
reversal, raised the question of whether statutory language
conferring concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts
Table 3
Model and expert consensus forecasts of case outcomes for
decided cases
Case outcome forecast
Correct Incorrect Inconclusive Total
Model 51 (75.0%) 17 (25.0%) 0 (0.0%) 68 (100.0%)
Expert consensus
forecasts
40 (58.8%) 21 (30.9%) 7 (10.3%) 68 (100.0%)
Note: Table is based on 68 cases. Row percentages are in parentheses. The expert consensus
forecast is based on the predictions of the majority of experts on a particular case. If only 2
experts predicted a given case and their predictions disagreed, the expert consensus forecast is
listed as “inconclusive.” Treating inconclusive forecasts as incorrect, the estimated (conditional
maximum likelihood) odds ratio is 2.088 (p = 0.067, Fisher’s Exact Test). Alternatively, we could
assume that if a third prediction had been obtained, the distribution of correct predictions would
mirror the overall distribution of correct expert prediction, resulting in 64.7% of the expert
consensus predictions being correct. Using this assumption, the estimated odds ratio is 1.630
(p = 0.262, Fisher’s exact test).
Figure 2
Model and expert forecasts of votes for decided cases
(n 5 67), by justice.
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barred removal to federal court of an action initiated by the
plaintiff in state court. It is likely that these cases, more
than most, turned on highly particularized features of the
case—perhaps conventional “legal” factors such as statu-
tory text and stare decisis—that the experts were able to
recognize and incorporate into their decision-making pro-
cess. The model, limited to the gross features of the case,
likely missed the very specific factors on which these out-
comes turned. The experts’ relatively better performance in
predicting justices’ votes in the federalism cases also sug-
gests that these votes often turned on factors not easily
captured by the blunt case characteristics relied upon by the
model.
The experts’ survey responses clarify the difference in
inputs between the two methods of prediction. Three of
the six variables used in the model—circuit of origin, iden-
tity of the petitioner, and identity of the respondent—were
deemed unimportant by large majorities of experts in the
predicted cases (64 percent, 69.1 percent, and 75.5 per-
cent, respectively). And unlike the model, the legal experts
put great weight on legal authority—primarily in the form
of prior Supreme Court opinions—in making their predic-
tions. Although the statistical model’s “issue area” variable
incorporates some legal factors, it could only influence pre-
dictions in a fairly blunt way, in contrast to the legal experts’
focus on particular cases, or even particular statements in
past cases.
The two methods of prediction are perhaps most simi-
lar in taking account of the justices’ preferences. The sta-
tistical model relied on a variable intended to capture the
ideological direction of the lower-court opinion. In fact,
the lower-court direction variable entered into the classifi-
cation trees for all justices except Stevens (who was fore-
cast to vote liberal on nearly every case), and for the small
subset of cases forecast to be unanimous in the conserva-
tive direction. Similarly, substantial majorities of the experts
responded that the justices’ policy preferences and their
conservative or liberal ideologies were important factors in
their forecasts.
Conclusions and Implications
We designed this study primarily to compare two methods
of assessing and predicting Supreme Court decision mak-
ing. We found—somewhat to our surprise—that for this
particular term the outcome predictions of the statistical
model were more accurate than those of the experts, despite
the fact that the experts were slightly better at forecasting
the votes of individual justices. Critically, the model did
significantly better than the experts at predicting the votes
of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Rehnquist, and this
fact, coupled with the importance of those three justices in
the ideological makeup of the current Supreme Court,
explains much of the statistical model’s success. Of course,
the number of predictions is small enough that these dif-
ferences may not hold across future terms, and additional
iterations of this project are necessary to form firm
conclusions.
Figure 3
Model and expert forecasts of case outcomes for
decided cases selected by issue area
Note: Issue areas are coded by Spaeth (2003) and are
mutually exclusive. The issue categories are: civil rights
(n 5 14), criminal procedure (n 5 14), economic activity
(n 5 16), judicial power (n 5 8), and federalism (n 5 5).
Figure 4
Model and expert forecasts of justice votes for decided
cases selected by issue area
Note: Issue areas are coded by Spaeth (2003), and are
mutually exclusive. The issue categories are: civil rights
(n 5 14), criminal procedure (n 5 14), economic activity
(n 5 16), judicial power (n 5 8), and federalism (n 5 5).
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With this caveat in mind, it is possible to discuss a few
implications of our results. The two prediction techniques
we used differ more dramatically in methodology than in
underlying theory, and one methodological distinction is
particularly stark. In calculating probabilities, the model
incorporated each of the 628 cases that the sitting natural
Court has decided in the past, and assigned each result
equal empirical weight. The legal experts, by contrast, did
what lawyers are trained to do—focus on a smaller subset of
cases and give predominant analytical weight to a few lead-
ing cases. Law professors who study the Court retrospec-
tively likewise focus on a handful, or at most a few dozen,
important cases, rather than assess every case in a given
term or given issue area. Even if an individual could take
into account every case in a given term, much less a decade,
the limits of human cognition would prevent an expert
from assigning equal analytical weight to every case, as the
model does. But there is a predictive benefit from a broad
observation of past Supreme Court behavior, and there may
be a similar benefit even in retrospective analyses from look-
ing at a greater swath of Supreme Court decisions than
typically considered by legal specialists.
A second difference in methodology has greater bearing
on the traditional law-politics debate about the factors that
underlie Supreme Court decision making. Although the
model incorporated a large number of past results in its
analysis, it took no account of the explanations the Court
itself gave for those decisions. Nor did it take into account
specific precedent or relevant statutory or constitutional text.
The model is essentially nonlegal in that the factors used to
predict decisions—the circuit of origin, the type of the peti-
tioner and respondent, and so forth—are indifferent to law.
If patterns relative to these observable factors capture legal
differences (grounded in text, history, or precedent) at all,
they do so only incidentally and with extreme generality.
Lawyers, politicians, and policy makers more generally
care as much or more about the form that the law takes as
about which party wins in a particular case. This concern
raises the question whether a statistical model could ever
forecast cases in terms of the legal principles they announce
instead of a simple “affirm” or “reverse” outcome. In theory,
the answer is yes, with a significant caveat. Statistical fore-
casting is possible whenever there is reliable training data. If
a reliable and replicable scheme existed to code for legal
arguments across a variety of case types, it could be applied
to a large number of past cases and used to develop a model
capable of predicting justices’ choices among legal princi-
ples. The difficulty, of course, lies in developing such a
coding system.
Conversely, although our experts were not limited to con-
sidering only “legal” factors, such as text and precedent,
they did rely consistently on such factors. In addition, they
were able to capture, in a manner that the model could not,
factual idiosyncrasies in particular cases, and to consider
how particular law might interact with particular facts to
affect outcomes. Still, the overall predictive success of the
model was higher—which suggests that for many cases an
expert’s ability to identify and analyze legal factors is not
much help in predicting the Court’s behavior.
Of interest in this regard is a subset of cases—those within
the broad subject area of “judicial power”—where the experts
did do well relative to the model. If one assumes that
Supreme Court decision making is multifaceted—that it is
an aggregation of the justice’s preferences, of strategic inter-
action with other branches and within the Court, and of
the constraints of text or precedent18—it is natural to also
assume that in certain cases some factors matter more than
in others. One motivation for this study was to determine
whether there are some kinds of cases where observable
“legal” factors are more important for the prediction of
outcomes. Our results in the judicial power cases suggest
that this is an area where “legal” factors are important.
There may be another implication of this project beyond
academia—in the world of litigants before the Supreme
Court and (if our model is extended) before other courts.
Expected outcomes play a huge role in litigants’ decisions
to press an appeal and in settlement negotiations, and to
the extent this statistical model (or an improved future ver-
sion) can reliably forecast judicial outcomes, it may benefit
practicing attorneys and their clients.
Finally, we hoped through this explicitly interdisciplin-
ary experiment to create a project of interest to the two
groups of scholars who study the Supreme Court most
closely, and thereby to enhance the gradually increasing
dialogue between our two disciplines. This symposium is
one realization of that aim, and we hope that the discussion
continues with insight from others in both political science
and law.
Notes
A complete reference list for the entire symposium appears on
pp. 791–93, below.
1 Lewis-Beck and Rice 1992; Poole and Rosenthal
1991.
2 We offer a necessarily abbreviated description of the
two methods of prediction and our major findings.
More detailed analyses, along with a complete descrip-
tion of the statistical model, may be found in our lon-
ger article in the May 2004 issue of the Columbia
Law Review, Ruger et al. 2004.
3 The statistical forecasting model uses classification
tree analysis and past voting behavior of the current
Supreme Court justices to compute probable out-
comes of decisions in the October 2002 term.
Breiman et al. 1984.
4 Our “model” for this study is actually eleven distinct clas-
sification trees. The first two predict whether, based
on the explanatory variables, a case is likely to be
either a unanimous “liberal” decision or a unanimous
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“conservative” decision. If a unanimous decision is
predicted in one direction then the forecast for that case
is complete. However, if neither initial model pre-
dicts a unanimous decision (or if both do, in opposite
directions), then the forecast is based on nine justice-
specific tree models that forecast the direction of the
vote of each justice. We allow the predicted votes of
some justices to enter into the decision trees of some
other justices to allow for interdependence. The spe-
cific trees used for forecasting were those with the best
out-of-sample forecasting properties.
5 As discussed on the project Web site (http://
wusct.wustl.edu), there was a bug in the code used to pro-
duce the forecasts given the classification trees. The
original posting on the Web site thus did not cor-
rectly reflect the predictions of the statistical model.
The forecasts currently on the Web site are the correct
forecasts. A technical description of the bug and rep-
lication information is available on the project Web
site.
6 Lower court decisions from a state court or a three-
judge federal district court were coded as arising
from the federal circuit encompassing the state.
7 Segal and Spaeth 2002.
8 The estimated classification trees for the other justices
are available on the project Web site and in an appen-
dix to Ruger et al. 2004.
9 We list the names of the participating experts in an
appendix to Ruger et al. 2004. We note with grati-
tude that the experts’ participation was an entirely vol-
unteer effort, and their substantial intellectual
generosity quite literally made this project possible.
10 Of the 76 cases in which the Court heard oral argu-
ment, we excluded 8 from our analysis. We excluded
3 cases because they were dismissed without opin-
ion (Abu-Ali Abdur©Rahman v. Ricky Bell, Ford Motor
Co. v. McCauley, and Nike, Inc. v. Kasky) and 2
because they were affirmed by an evenly divided Court,
with no information about individual votes (Borden
Ranch Partnership v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
Dow Chemical v. Stephenson). We excluded 3 addi-
tional cases due to intractable coding ambiguities
(Virginia v. Black, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,
and National Park Hospitality Assn. v. Dept. of Inte-
rior). See Ruger et al. 2004.
11 We excluded Chavez v. Martinez from our vote analy-
sis only, due to coding difficulties caused by ambigu-
ous concurrences by some of the justices.
12 Treating individual expert predictions independently
might be misleading, because the same number of
experts did not predict each case, meaning that the
weight of the machine’s forecasts differs depending upon
the number of experts who also predicted that case.
13 Cases with only two experts with opposite predictions
result in an inconclusive “expert consensus” forecast.
We could treat these inconclusives as incorrect (result-
ing in a 58.8 percent success rate for the experts),
exclude them altogether (resulting in a 65.6 percent suc-
cess rate), or assume that if a third prediction had
been obtained in all these cases, the distribution of cor-
rect predictions would mirror the overall distribu-
tion of correct expert predictions (resulting in a 64.7
percent success rate).
14 Fisher 1935.
15 Martin and Quinn 2002.
16 Experts were sent a survey following receipt of their pre-
diction in a particular case. Experts predicting more
than one case received a survey for each case. In all,
approximately 90 percent of our experts returned at
least one survey, and we received responses for 65 per-
cent of the expert predictions made during the term.
The survey presented a list of factors that might be con-
sidered relevant to predicting Court decision-
making and asked experts how important each factor
was to his or her prediction in a given case. Respon-
dents were asked to rate the factors on a 5 point Lik-
ert scale (15not at all important; 55very important).
Over two-thirds (67.5 percent) of the respondents indi-
cated that the “policy preferences of the justices on
the specific issue presented” was an important factor (4
or 5), and over half (54.3 percent) responded that
“the conservative or liberal ideologies of the individual
justices” was an important factor (4 or 5).
17 These issue codes are based on the VALUE variable in
Spaeth 2003.
18 See, for example, Epstein and Knight 1998.
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